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Thesis

Foundations of practical reason

Abstract:

This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective.

The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that mor...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Merton College
Role:
Author

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Role:
Supervisor
Publication date:
2007
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford
Source identifiers:
602450699
Language:
English
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:12719f6b-eeb1-404f-8eff-bb5f1782ab84
Local pid:
td:602450699
Deposit date:
2013-06-22

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