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Perceptual knowledge of nonactual possibilities

Abstract:

It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge ofnonactual (metaphysical1) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to knowthat a propositionpis necessary or thatpis possible (ifpis false) by senseperception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception isnot so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception.While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency,others concern necessity and impossibility. ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1111/phpe.12069

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Department:
Philosophy
Department:
Unknown
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Wiley Publisher's website
Journal:
Philosophical Perspectives Journal website
Volume:
29
Issue:
1
Pages:
363-375
Publication date:
2016-04-22
Acceptance date:
2015-08-17
DOI:
EISSN:
1758-2245
ISSN:
1520-8583
Language:
English
Pubs id:
pubs:1043987
UUID:
uuid:17e7b574-2d47-412e-92bd-220647381865
Local pid:
pubs:1043987
Source identifiers:
1043987
Deposit date:
2019-08-15

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