Working paper icon

Working paper

Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty

Abstract:

A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public official strategically interact as the potential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service. Individuals differ in the internalized moral cost generated by corruption, and may have only imperfect information on others' moral cost, i.e. their "corruptibility". This paper investigates the role the imperfect information ...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Sub department:
CSAE
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Role:
Author
Series:
CSAE working paper series
Place of publication:
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/main-wps.html
Publication date:
2008-01-01
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:2257e3d3-733b-4712-8140-261d6ae2effa
Local pid:
ora:2544
Deposit date:
2009-01-23

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP