Journal article
Elusive externalism
- Abstract:
-
Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism, and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘p, but I shouldn’t believe p’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the intern...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Mind Journal website
- Volume:
- 128
- Issue:
- 510
- Pages:
- 397-427
- Publication date:
- 2017-11-04
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-08-04
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1460-2113
- ISSN:
-
0026-4423
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:974680
- UUID:
-
uuid:2473a99c-3f26-4735-84ca-cd5aa8acc31a
- Local pid:
- pubs:974680
- Source identifiers:
-
974680
- Deposit date:
- 2019-02-19
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Salow
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- © Salow 2017.
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