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Thesis

Decentralized leadership and follower deception in Stackelberg games

Abstract:

This thesis focuses on two aspects of Stackelberg games — decentralized leadership and follower deception — that stem from reasoning about strategic interactions at a higher level in Stackelberg games.

In the first part of the thesis, we study decentralized leadership in Stackelberg games. We focus on a variant of Stackelberg security games that involves multiple leaders, in which the leaders allocate their security resources to protect a set of targets against an attacker; the att...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Jesus College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Balliol College
Role:
Supervisor
ORCID:
0000-0001-6718-3436
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Hertford College
Role:
Supervisor
ORCID:
0000-0002-9329-8410
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Brasenose College
Role:
Examiner
Institution:
Harvard University
Role:
Examiner
More from this funder
Programme:
International Doctoral Scholars Grant
Funding agency for:
Gan, J
Grant:
EP/N509711/1
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford

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