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Learning to Play Nash.

Abstract:

Although there exist rules that converge to Nash equilibrium for special classes of games (like fictuous play in zero-sum games), it is an open question whether players can learn to play Nash in general games without assuming that they have a prior knowledge of their opponent's strategies. We exhibit a large class of statistical hypothesis testing procedures that solve this problem. At each time, every player has a hypothesis about his opponents' repeated game strategies. He frequently tests ...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (Johns Hopkins University)
Series:
Working Papers
Publication date:
2000-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:360ecc5b-88ab-4642-a397-aac70fe29188
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11993
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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