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Moral status and the wrongness of paternalism

Abstract:

In this paper, I consider the view that paternalism is wrong when it demeans or diminishes the paternalizee’s moral status (the Moral Status Argument). I argue that we should reject the Moral Status Argument because it is both too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because it cannot account for the wrongness of some of the most objectionable paternalistic interventions, namely strong paternalistic interventions. It is too broad because it is unable to distinguish between wrongful paternal...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.5840/soctheorpract201440329

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Research group:
Neurointerventions in Crime Prevention: An Ethical Analysis
Role:
Author
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Funding agency for:
Birks, D
Grant:
100705/z/12/z
Wellcome Trust More from this funder
Publisher:
Philosophy Documentation Center Publisher's website
Journal:
Social Theory and Practice Journal website
Volume:
40
Issue:
3
Pages:
483-498
Publication date:
2014-07-01
DOI:
EISSN:
2154-123X
ISSN:
0037-802X
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:3666af99-ff21-46fd-acf6-0583fb664935
Local pid:
ora:9785
Deposit date:
2015-01-22

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