Working paper
Re-thinking reputation
- Abstract:
- Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date. Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world. We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the history that would be available and how it might be used. This new approach can explain cycles in reputations.
- Publication status:
- Published
Actions
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford Publisher's website
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2011-09-01
- Paper number:
- 565
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1143872
- Local pid:
- pubs:1143872
- Deposit date:
- 2020-12-15
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2011
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2011 The Author(s)
Metrics
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record