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Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions

Abstract:

We develop and extend a line of recent work on the design of mechanisms for two-sided markets. Œe markets we consider consist of buyers and sellers of a number of items, and the aim of a mechanism is to improve the social welfare by arranging purchases and sales of the items. A mechanism is given prior distributions on the agents’ valuations of the items, but not the actual valuations; thus the aim is to maximise the expected social welfare over these distributions. As in previous work, we ar...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1145/3033274.3085128

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
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Publisher:
Association for Computing Machinery Publisher's website
Journal:
EC'17: 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation Journal website
Pages:
591-608
Host title:
EC'17: 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publication date:
2017-06-20
Acceptance date:
2017-04-20
DOI:
Source identifiers:
691609
ISBN:
9781450345279
Pubs id:
pubs:691609
UUID:
uuid:39bdac0a-878c-4414-884e-379e34f8aa6c
Local pid:
pubs:691609
Deposit date:
2017-04-28

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