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The Shapley Axiomatization for Values in Partition Function Games
- Abstract:
-
One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player’s marginal contribution—a central notion to the Shapley value—be defined in a variety of ways, but it is also not obvious which axiomatization should be used. Consequently, a number of authors extended the Shapley value using complex and often unintuitive axiomatizations. Furthermore, no algor...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- DCS
- Publication date:
- 2013-01-01
Item Description
- UUID:
-
uuid:3a6ccb3a-6bf5-4e76-b182-0a48deb775ea
- Local pid:
- cs:6831
- Deposit date:
- 2015-03-31
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- Copyright date:
- 2013
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