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Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions

Abstract:

A well-known myopic bidding strategy fails to support an equilibrium of simultaneous ascending proxy auctions for heterogeneous items when a hard-close rule is in place. This is because, in common with the single-auction case, last minute bidding (sniping) is a best response to naive behaviour. However, a modification to the myopic strategy in which all bidders submit an additional bid in the closing stages of the auction-a practice I call 'defensive sniping'-is shown to yield an efficient, b...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.11.006

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Oxford Internet Institute
Role:
Author
Economic and Social Research Council More from this funder
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Mathematical Economics Journal website
Volume:
48
Issue:
1
Pages:
51-58
Publication date:
2012-01-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0304-4068
Source identifiers:
307420
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:307420
UUID:
uuid:3c3181ca-abf1-41e5-87a5-14cfd1aff192
Local pid:
pubs:307420
Deposit date:
2015-10-26

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