Book section icon

Book section

Reasons-based moral judgment and the erotetic theory

Abstract:

We argue that moral decision making is reasons-based, focusing on the idea that people encounter decisions as questions to be answered and that they process reasons to the extent that they can see them as putative answers to those questions. After introducing our topic, we sketch the erotetic reasons-based framework for decision making. We then describe three experiments that extend this framework to moral decision making in different question frames, cast doubt on theories of moral decis...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.4324/9781315675992

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
St Catherine's College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Publisher:
Routledge Publisher's website
Pages:
77-106
Series:
Current Issues in Thinking and Reasoning
Host title:
Moral Inferences
Publication date:
2017-01-19
DOI:
Source identifiers:
661550
ISBN:
9781138937970
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:661550
UUID:
uuid:42f82ae9-1220-4b9c-bade-33a7c21ba56d
Local pid:
pubs:661550
Deposit date:
2016-11-24

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP