Journal article
Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia
- Abstract:
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In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refu...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Version of record, pdf, 445.2KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.concog.2019.102770
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Consciousness and Cognition Journal website
- Volume:
- 74
- Article number:
- 102770
- Publication date:
- 2019-07-02
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-06-19
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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1053-8100
- Source identifiers:
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1018186
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:1018186
- UUID:
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uuid:47d396b1-2aa1-4794-b0c3-96a0ae3a6f32
- Local pid:
- pubs:1018186
- Deposit date:
- 2019-06-19
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Henriksen et al
- Copyright date:
- 2019
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
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