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Journal article

Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia

Abstract:

In contemporary consciousness research, we have defended a position of experiential minimalism, arguing that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a necessary, universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness refers to the fact that experiences are given first-personally to the subject of experience. To challenge the universality of for-me-ness, several authors have referred to the case of thought insertion as a clear counter example. In this study, we address and refu...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.concog.2019.102770

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Department:
Philosophy
Department:
Unknown
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Consciousness and Cognition Journal website
Volume:
74
Article number:
102770
Publication date:
2019-07-02
Acceptance date:
2019-06-19
DOI:
ISSN:
1053-8100
Source identifiers:
1018186
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:1018186
UUID:
uuid:47d396b1-2aa1-4794-b0c3-96a0ae3a6f32
Local pid:
pubs:1018186
Deposit date:
2019-06-19

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