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Simulating cardinal preferences in Boolean games: A proof technique

Abstract:

Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games with a logical flavour. While they have proved to be a popular formalism in the multiagent community, a commonly cited shortcoming is their inability to express richer utilities than success or failure. In addition to being a modelling limitation, this parsimony of preference has made proving complexity bounds difficult. We address the second of these issues by demonstrating how cardinal utilities can be simulated via exp...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Files:
  • (Accepted manuscript, pdf, 693.6KB)
Publisher copy:
10.1016/j.ic.2017.09.008

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Merton College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Information and Computation Journal website
Volume:
261
Issue:
3
Pages:
488-518
Publication date:
2018-04-02
Acceptance date:
2017-11-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1090-2651
ISSN:
0890-5401
Source identifiers:
747125
Pubs id:
pubs:747125
UUID:
uuid:48f08657-4077-4cd9-b6af-8b86ab6ab771
Local pid:
pubs:747125
Deposit date:
2017-11-21

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