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Intuitive and Counterintuitive Morality

Abstract:

Recent work in the cognitive science of morality has been taken to show that moral judgment is largely based on immediate intuitions and emotions. However, according to Greene’s influential dual process model, deliberative processing not only plays a significant role in moral judgment, but also favours a distinctive type of content—a broadly utilitarian approach to ethics. This chapter argues that this proposed tie between process and content is based on concept...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Reviewed (other)

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.001.0001

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
Pembroke College
Role:
Author

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Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Host title:
Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics
Publication date:
2014-11-05
DOI:
Source identifiers:
735473
ISBN:
9780198717812
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:735473
UUID:
uuid:5b20451d-4178-48d7-86d7-404b0f38b213
Local pid:
pubs:735473
Deposit date:
2017-10-15

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