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Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability

Abstract:
I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
Exeter College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Kluwer Academic Publishers (now Springer) Publisher's website
Journal:
Erkenntnis Journal website
Volume:
60
Issue:
3
Pages:
371–416
Publication date:
2004-05-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1572-8420
ISSN:
0165-0106
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:60042f77-46ca-4f0a-8e81-599467561d02
Local pid:
ora:1526
Deposit date:
2008-03-14

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