Thesis icon

Thesis

Status, signalling and positional competition

Abstract:

The first chapter analyses a game between the desired and undesired agents and the Decision Maker (DM), who only wants to admit the desired agents. To influence the DM’s decision, both types of agents can purchase an ostentatious good at the same price, yet the undesired agent sometimes fails to make the right impression. I investigate how the imposition of a capacity constraint can improve the outcomes for the DM. I show that committing to ignore the message received from the agent is an ...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


More by this author
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Author

Contributors

Role:
Supervisor
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford
Language:
English
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:606b8419-572c-4c4c-a605-80ae4cbdc5af
Deposit date:
2019-06-19

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP