Journal article
Bounds on the cost of stabilizing a cooperative game
- Abstract:
-
A key issue in cooperative game theory is coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core---the set of outcomes that are resistant to group deviations. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. We investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using subsidies. We consider scenarios where an external party that is interested in having the players work together offers a supplemental payment to the grand coal...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Funding
+ European Research Council
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Grant:
Starting Grant ACCORD (Grant Agreement 639945
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- AI Access Foundation Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research Journal website
- Volume:
- 63
- Pages:
- 87–1023
- Publication date:
- 2018-12-27
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-11-28
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1943-5037
- ISSN:
-
1076-9757
- Source identifiers:
-
951380
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:951380
- UUID:
-
uuid:95d2724e-9d0f-435f-825a-20ab20d832ef
- Local pid:
- pubs:951380
- Deposit date:
- 2018-12-10
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- AI Access Foundation
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2018 AI Access Foundation. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from AI Access Foundation at: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11270
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