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Working paper

Reputation and credit without collateral in Africa's formal banking

Abstract:

The analysis of reputation as a contract enforcement instrument where legal institutions, especially commercial courts, fail to enforce commercial contracts has focused on informal credit markets. The literature centres on the argument that lenders or co-borrowers in group lending can easily monitor each borrower, given the small size of an individual lender's market. Verifiability allows the detection of opportunistic default and hence allows its punishment. This paper argues that in Africa,...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed

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Institution:
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
Role:
Author
Series:
CSAE working paper series
Place of publication:
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/main-wps.html
Publication date:
2005-01-01
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:9b0f8677-11f5-4b6d-96e1-34d7a29246e2
Local pid:
ora:2626
Deposit date:
2009-03-02

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