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Grand extortion: coup risk and the military as a protection racket

Abstract:

The governments of many developing countries face a risk of a coup d’état perpetrated by their own military establishment. The phenomenon is especially acute in Africa. We develop a game theoretic model in which the military decides to threaten a coup, and the other party, the government, responds by raising military spending. This strategic interdependence can be interpreted as a model of extortion. We show that this behaviour is more likely when the underlying risk of a coup is high. Using ...

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Publication status:
Not published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Research group:
Centre for the Study of African Economies
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Research group:
Centre for the Study of African Economies
Role:
Author
Publication date:
2006-01-01
Language:
English
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:9cff0f31-1a63-4de5-8b23-bc9b50946057
Local pid:
ora:1696
Deposit date:
2008-03-14

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