Book section : Chapter
Obligación y práctica social
- Abstract:
-
Hart thought that the content of our duties is determined by what we do as a matter of settled practice and their force is given by our attitude of acceptance towards our practice. He thought that both parts of the account constitute conceptual truths to be found in the logic of claims of duty. I show that these claims fail. I then consider a realist variant which rejects Hart's conception of reasons as a kind of normative attitude. This variant supposes that objective moral facts, ultimately...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
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-
(Accepted manuscript, 462.7KB)
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- Publication website:
- https://www.marcialpons.es/libros/convencionalismo-y-derecho/9788416402915/
Authors
Contributors
+ Ramírez Ludeña, L
Role:
Editor
+ Vilajosana Rubio, JM
Role:
Editor
+ Ramírez Ludeña, L
Role:
Translator
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Marcial Pons Publisher's website
- Host title:
- Convencionalismo y derecho
- Chapter number:
- 7
- Place of publication:
- Madrid
- Publication date:
- 2016-01-28
- ISBN:
- 9788416402915
Item Description
- Language:
- Spanish
- Keywords:
- Subtype:
- Chapter
- Pubs id:
-
1151216
- Local pid:
- pubs:1151216
- Deposit date:
- 2020-12-24
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2016
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