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Obligación y práctica social

Abstract:

Hart thought that the content of our duties is determined by what we do as a matter of settled practice and their force is given by our attitude of acceptance towards our practice. He thought that both parts of the account constitute conceptual truths to be found in the logic of claims of duty. I show that these claims fail. I then consider a realist variant which rejects Hart's conception of reasons as a kind of normative attitude. This variant supposes that objective moral facts, ultimately...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Law
Sub department:
Law Faculty
Role:
Author

Contributors

Role:
Translator
Publisher:
Marcial Pons Publisher's website
Host title:
Convencionalismo y derecho
Chapter number:
7
Place of publication:
Madrid
Publication date:
2016-01-28
ISBN:
9788416402915
Language:
Spanish
Keywords:
Subtype:
Chapter
Pubs id:
1151216
Local pid:
pubs:1151216
Deposit date:
2020-12-24

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