Journal article
Time consistency, learning by doing and infant-industry protection: the linear case
- Abstract:
- This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with precommitment but decreasing in it if the government cannot precommit to future subsidies. The infant-industry argument is thus reversed in the absence of precommitment.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Economic & Social Research Institute Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Economic and Social Review Journal website
- Volume:
- 26
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 59-68
- Publication date:
- 1994-01-01
- ISSN:
-
0012-9984
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- UUID:
-
uuid:cf3a0c01-e241-4141-b72d-f65e6c089bf9
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10463
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
Related Items
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Economic and Social Review
- Copyright date:
- 1994
- Notes:
- This article has been made available under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 1.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-SA 1.0) licence.
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