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International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment

Abstract:

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D; subsidy and welfare are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (th...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University College Dublin
Role:
Author
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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Research group:
Industrial Economics
Oxford college:
Merton College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Blackwell Publishing Publisher's website
Journal:
Review of International Economics Journal website
Volume:
4
Issue:
3
Pages:
322-338
Publication date:
1996-10-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1467-9396
ISSN:
0965-7576
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:df2b5728-9307-4558-950b-27d127946ea4
Local pid:
ora:2142
Deposit date:
2008-06-27

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