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Thesis

Design of an application process for research grants

Abstract:

We use a version of a Bayesian Stackelberg game to model a one-stage application process for research grants. A research council wants to allocate research grants to researchers in an environment of imperfect information. The information asymmetry stems from the fact that selection should ideally be based on the quality of the researcher's project. However, neither the researcher nor the research council know the quality but each agent receives a separate signal that is informative about i...

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Oxford college:
Nuffield College
Role:
Author

Contributors

Role:
Supervisor
Publication date:
2011
Type of award:
MPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:ebb948fa-c4f3-4126-a698-e2bfcd1b5998
Deposit date:
2016-11-15

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