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Externality and framing effects in a bribery experiment

Abstract:
Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are increased bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted. And when the game is presented as a bribery scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted. We discuss two possible reasons as to why our experiment leads to the identification of these effects while previous experiments did not.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Not peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Sub department:
CSAE
Research group:
Development Economics
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Sub department:
CSAE
Oxford college:
St Antony's College
Role:
Author
Series:
CSAE working paper series
Place of publication:
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/main-wps.html
Publication date:
2007-01-01
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:fdc6114d-8a83-4e64-853b-ee13574f1349
Local pid:
ora:2597
Deposit date:
2009-02-10

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