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Mechanism design for defense coordination in security games

Abstract:

Recent work studied Stackelberg security games with multiple defenders, in which heterogeneous defenders allocate security resources to protect a set of targets against a strategic attacker. Equilibrium analysis was conducted to characterize outcomes of these games when defenders act independently. Our starting point is the observation that the use of resources in equilibria may be inefficient due to lack of coordination. We explore the possibility of reducing this inefficiency by coordinatin...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publication website:
https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.5555/3398761.3398812

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Oxford college:
Jesus College
Role:
Author
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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-9329-8410
Publisher:
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems Publisher's website
Pages:
402-410
Host title:
AAMAS '20: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Publication date:
2020-05-05
Acceptance date:
2020-01-15
Event title:
19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2020)
Event location:
Auckland, New Zealand
Event website:
https://aamas2020.conference.auckland.ac.nz/
Event start date:
2020-05-09T00:00:00Z
Event end date:
2020-05-13T00:00:00Z
EISSN:
1558-2914
ISSN:
1548-8403
ISBN:
9781450375184
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1148903
Local pid:
pubs:1148903
Deposit date:
2021-04-19

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